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Out of Thin Air: Evaluating the Legality of
the Clean Power Plan Under the Equal
Sovereignty Principle
byDEEPA SHARMA*
Introduction
On October 23, 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
finalized a groundbreaking rule, known as the Clean Power Plan, which
would reduce carbon emissions by focusing on pollution from power plants
and setting state-specific emissions goals.' The overall purpose of the rule
is to decrease the United States' C02 emission levels from the year 2005
by thirty-two percent by 2030.2 The regulation targets the electricity
sector, an industry that is responsible for emitting thirty-one percent of all
C02 emissions in the United States. 3 As of this note, twenty-nine states
have mounted legal challenges against the regulation's implementation on
federalism and statutory construction grounds, and the Supreme Court
recently issued a stay of the rule until the D.C. Circuit decides the merits of
these legal challenges.4
The Clean Power Plan establishes national standards for C02
emissions under the auspices of section 11 (d) of the Clean Air Act, which
requires states to develop emission standards for pollutants emitted by
* J.D. Candidate 2016, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A. 2009,
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their expert guidance, thoughtful feedback, and encouragement. I also thank all the editors of the
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1. Clean Power Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64661 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
60).
2. Id. at 64665.
3. Environmental Protection Agency, Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/ccctricity.html (last visited Dec. 22,
2015).
4. Adam Liptak & Coral Davenport, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Obama's Efforts to
Regulate Coal Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/l0/us/
politics/supreme-court-blocks-obama-epa-coal-emissions-rcgulationshtml.
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existing sources of pollution. The EPA contends that section 111 (d) gives
the agency the authority to regulate power plants as existing sources of
pollution. 5  Thus, under the rule, states that have qualifying Electric
Generating Units ("EGUs"), or power plants, will be required to develop
and implement plans that set emission standards for these EGUs, or find
other ways of meeting the state-specific emissions targets.6 In keeping
with the cooperative federalism approach found in environmental statutes
like the Clean Air Act, the Clean Power Plan allows states and power
plants the flexibility to decide how they will meet their emissions
reductions goals.
The final rule specifies that the States of Alaska and Hawaii, as well
as the territories of Guam and Puerto Rico, do not have to comply with the
requirements of the rule because the "EPA does not possess all of the
information or analytical tools needed to quantify the BSER (Best System
of Emission Reduction)." 7  The State of Vermont and the District of
Columbia also do not have to comply with the requirements of the rule
because these areas do not house affected EGUs. The rule also
acknowledges the burdens that coal-country states will face in terms of job
losses and posits that the economic side effects that may result from the
policy will be mitigated by the POWER+ plan, a program that "addresses
the important legacy costs in coal country."
8
Because Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from the rule, and because
coal states will bear a significant burden under the regulation, one potential
legal defect of the Clean Power Rule is that it violates the Equal
Sovereignty Principle. 9 The doctrine served as the basis for invalidating
the preclearance formula in the Voting Rights Act. 10 According to Chief
Justice Roberts's majority opinion in Shelby v. Holder, the Equal
Sovereignty Principle must be factored in when assessing the "disparate
treatment of states," reasoning that "the constitutional equality of the States
is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the
Republic was organized."' 1 Accordingly, Chief Justice Roberts calls for a
5. Clean Power Rule, supra note 1, at 64663.
6. Id at 64664.
7. Id.
8. Clean Power Rule, supra note 1, at 64670.
9. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013).
10. Id. at 2631.
11. Id. at 2623.
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more stringent level of review for federal government actions that treat
states differently.'
2
The Clean Power Plan may be inconsistent with the Equal Sovereignty
Principle because (1) the rule singles out states for disparate treatment in
two ways and (2) the EPA has an insufficient justification for the disparate
treatment in both instances. The rule singles out states for disparate
treatment by exempting the States of Alaska and Hawaii from compliance,
thus denying them of the benefits of the Clean Power Plan. The rule also
results in a disproportionate burden on coal-producing states because they
will have to expend significant resources to transition to a clean energy
economy while weakening existing domestic industries, a burden that other
states do not have to bear. Insufficient justification for disparate treatment
would violate the Equal Sovereignty Principle.
This Note argues that, because the Clean Power Plan provides a
benefit to the states in which it applies, the exemption singled out the states
to which it does not apply-Alaska and Hawaii-for disfavored treatment,
and the government did not have a compelling reason for doing so. This
results in the violation of the Equal Sovereignty Principle as articulated in
Shelby v. Holder. This Note also contends that the disproportionate burden
facing coal-producing states under the rule does not constitute disparate
treatment, and accordingly, the Equal Sovereignty Principle does not apply
to this argument. Part I of this paper explores the background and
controversy behind the Clean Power Plan. Part II of this Note analyzes the
Equal Sovereignty Principle and discusses how courts have treated Equal
Sovereignty arguments. Part III explores a framework for applying the
Equal Sovereignty Principle. Part IV applies the analytical framework to
the Clean Power Plan. Part V concludes the paper by discussing the
potential benefits of applying the Equal Sovereignty Principle in the
climate change context.
1. Background
The Clean Power Plan marks "the strongest action ever taken in the
United States to combat climate change."' 3  The plan sets uniform
standards for energy generating facilities: Natural gas plants have a
performance target of 771 pounds of carbon per megawatt-hour of power,
while coal and oil plants must meet a target of 1,305 pounds of carbon per
12. ld. at2621.
13. Coral Davenport & Gardiner Harris, Obama to Unveil Tougher Environmental Plan
with His Legacy in Mind, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimcs.com/2015/08/02
/us/obama-to-unveil-tougher-climate-plan-with-his-legacy-in-mind.html.
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megawatt-hour.' 4 The rule also sets a particular state's emissions target
based on the weighted aggregate of the rate goals outlined for the two types
of power plants.' 5 For example, if a state has twenty-five power plants, and
twenty-two of them are coal-fired plants (with the remainder of them being
natural gas plants), the state's overall emissions goal would equal 1,242
pounds of carbon per megawatt-hour. The state then has the flexibility to
come up with ways to meet its target-it could require the plants
themselves to meet their individualized emissions targets or the state could
accomplish its obligations by establishing a cap-and-trade program, join an
existing cap-and-trade scheme, or enact renewable portfolio standards.'
6
States are obligated to submit a plan to the EPA detailing the course of
action it has selected to meet the standards.'
7
The practical impact of the rule is that it will result in significant
reductions in the United States' contribution to greenhouse gas emissions,
mirroring the steps that countries like China are taking to reduce their own
relative contributions.' 8 However, in many states, the fossil fuel economy
continues to provide jobs that are perceived as crucial to the vitality of their
local economies. Thus, states have expressed deep concerns with the rule.
Attorney General Patrick Morrissey of West Virginia said in an interview:
"We think this regulation is terrible for the consumers of the state of West
Virginia. It's going to lead to reduced jobs, higher electricity rates, and
really will put stress on the reliability of the power grid."' 9 Kentucky
Energy and Environment Secretary Leonard Peters, commenting on the
stricter targets the state would have to meet compared to the draft rule, said
that "if the rule was a book, the draft would be a murder mystery and the
final rule would be a comedy. 20
Accordingly, over two dozen states have filed suit to challenge the
validity of the rule. Opponents of the Clean Power Plan contend the rule is
legally vulnerable on a variety of constitutional and statutory interpretation
grounds. For example, they argue that section 111 (d) does not give the
EPA the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions by mandating
14. Clean Power Rule, supra note 1, at 64667.
15. Id. at 64674.
16. Clean Power Rule, supra note 1, at 64695-96.
17. Id. at 64697.
18. Id. at 64699.
19. Davenport & Harris, supra note 13.
20. Jean Chemnick and Emily Holden, Clean Power Plan Ratchets Up Burdens on Coal
States, E&E NEWS (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/storics/1060023333.
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reductions from regulated power plant sources. Another example of a
statutory construction argument against the rule stems from the fact that the
rule requires states and electricity generating facilities to comply with a
new and complex regulatory scheme, requiring states to submit
implementation plans to the EPA similar to the Clean Air Act requirements
regarding State Implementation Plans ("SIPs"). Accordingly, the rule
imposes a statutory scheme that is just as onerous and cumbersome as the
organic statute itself, without additional congressional authorization. This
goes against the principle stated by Justice Scalia in Whitman v. American
Trucking: "Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental details
of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions-it does not,
one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes."
22
There are also constitutional challenges to the Clean Power Plan on
the basis of the rule upsetting the horizontal separation of powers.
Professor Laurence Tribe argues that the rule violates the Tenth
23Amendment. As articulated in Printz v. United States, the Tenth
Amendment precludes the federal government from subverting the
democratic process and commandeering state governments by compelling
them to implement federal policies.24 Professor Tribe argues that the Clean
Power Plan effectively allows the federal government to dictate a state's
energy mix, while imposing the costs of implementing its choice onto the
25states . According to Professor Tribe, this arrangement impermissibly
deprives the citizens of the states the opportunity to hold the actual
responsible parties politically accountable.26  Other constitutional law
scholars contend that this argument is not persuasive: The Clean Power
Plan is modeled after statutes such as the Clean Air Act, which give states
21. David A. Zillberberg, EPA Issues Ambitious Clean Power Plan Mandating Significant
Reductions to GHG Emissions from the Power Industry by 2030, 15 PRATT'S ENERGY LAW
REPORT 9 (LexisNexis A.S. Pratt).
22. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
23. EPA'S Proposed 111(d) Rule for Existing Power Plants: Legal and Cost Issues:
Hearing on the Clean Power Rule Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the H. Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 16-23 (2015) (statement of Laurence Tribe),
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF03/20150317/103073/HH RG- 114-IF03-Wstate-TribeL-
20150317-U1.pdf.
24. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
25. Tribe, supra note 23, at 19-23.
26. Id. at 22.
Summer 2016] OUT OF THIN AIR
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
the flexibility to decide how to comply with federal standards, and have not
been found to pose constitutional problems.
27
However, another principle concerning the horizontal separation of
powers that has come up in recent case law, and may also be relevant to the
Clean Power Plan, is the Equal Sovereignty doctrine. 28  The principle
served as the basis for invalidating the preclearance formula in the Voting
Rights Act. 2 9 The Shelby County Court did not define the reaches of the
Equal Sovereignty Principle, and thus, the doctrine has the potential to
serve as a basis for striking down federal government actions in the future.
Indeed, as Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent in Shelby County, the
decision "is capable of much mischief.' '30 The Equal Sovereignty Principle
may prove particularly relevant in the climate change context, where
certain states may be saddled with regulatory burdens that others are
exempt from by virtue of their proximity to coastlines, or their relative
contributions to the problem.
II. The Equal Sovereignty Principle
The Supreme Court largely rested its decision to strike down section 4
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 on the Equal Sovereignty Principle. 31 Up
until Shelby County, the concept of equal sovereignty, or the presumption
of equality among the states, was rarely invoked in case law.32 In fact, in
1966, when the Supreme Court considered a constitutional challenge to the
Voting Rights Act, the majority dismissed the argument that the federal
government could not target specific states.33 Thus, commentators fiercely
criticized the Shelby County decision for striking down a law of such
import based on a questionable legal hook. Judge Richard Posner, Chief
Judge of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote that equal
sovereignty "is a principle of constitutional law of which I had never
heard-for the excellent reason that. . . there is no such principle ... [t]he
27. Richard Revesz, Obama's Professor on Clean Power Plan-Wrong on the Facts and
Law, THE HILL (Dcc. 9, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://thchill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/energy-enviro
nmcnt/226449-obamas-professor-on-clean-power-plan-wrong-on-facts-and.
28. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013).
29. Id. at 2631.
30. Id. at 2649.
31. James Blaekshcr & Lani Guinicr, Free at Last: Rejecting Equal Sovereignty and
Restoring the Constitutional Right To Vote Shelby County v. Holder, 8 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV.
39, 44 (2014).
32. Id.
33. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328-29 (1966).
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opinion rests on air."34 David Gans of the Constitutional Accountability
Center commented: "No matter how many times one reads our
Constitution, the simple fact is that there is no 'Equality of States Clause'
in it.
'35
Others argue that there "is indeed a deep structural principle of equal
sovereignty that runs through the Constitution. "36 Thomas Colby argues
that the Equal Footing doctrine, which has been recognized by the courts,
necessarily implies the existence of the Equal Sovereignty Principle.3 7 The
Equal Footing doctrine concerns the admission of new states to the union,
and whether they are admitted on the same terms as existing states.38 The
Shelby County opinion cited, but did not analyze, three cases in support of
its invocation of Equal Sovereignty: Coyle v. Smith, United States v.
Louisiana, and Pollard v. Hagan, all of which are Equal Footing doctrine
cases. 39 Colby, thus, argues that the Equal Footing doctrine inheres the
Equal Sovereignty Principle because "Congress cannot admit a new state
without making it the sovereign equal of the other states.,
40
In order to analyze whether the Equal Sovereignty Principle applies,
and whether the principle would potentially affect the Clean Power Plan, it
is necessary to analyze cases in which courts have faced Equal Sovereignty
arguments. Equal Sovereignty arguments have been invoked in cases pre-
and post-Shelby County with mixed results. In United States v. Ptasynski,
the Supreme Court faced the question of whether a federal statute that
exempted a particular state's oil from a tax was valid.4' In Nuclear Energy
Institute, Inc. v. EPA ("NEI"), the D.C. Circuit Court considered Equal
Sovereignty claims in the environmental context.4  Shelby County
considered the constitutionality of the preclearance formula in the Voting
Rights Act, which required some states to seek permission from the federal
government before making changes to their voting laws, and was the first
34. Richard A. Posncr, The Voting Rights Act Ruling Is About The Conservative
Imagination, SLATE (June 26, 2013, 12:16 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ncws and-politics
/the breakfast table/features/2013/supreme-court_2013/the-suprcmecourt and the voting rig
hts actstriking down the law is all.html.
35. Thomas Colby, In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65 DUKE L.J.
(forthcoming 2016).
36. Id. at4.
37. Id. at 15-17.
38. Id. at 15-16.
39. Id. at 19.
40. Id. at 17.
41. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1983).
42. Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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case that struck down a portion of a statute on Equal Sovereignty
grounds.43 In the Third Circuit case of NCAA v. New Jersey, decided post-
Shelby County, the court considered the constitutionality of a federal law
that banned the licensing of sports betting in all but one state.4 Together,
these cases illustrate how the doctrine may be applied in future instances.
A. United States v. Ptasynski
In Ptaskynski, the Court considered the constitutionality of a federal
statute to exempt oil produced in Alaska from the Crude Oil Windfall
Profit Tax Act.45 The Act imposed an excise tax on oil producers, and the
rate of the tax was determined by the category of producer and type of oil
produced.46 The Act exempted oil owned by governments and charities,
Alaskan oil, oil produced on Native American lands, and "front-end" oil,
from the tax.47 The plaintiffs, largely domestic oil producers and the States
of Louisiana and Texas, contended that the Alaskan Oil exemption violated
the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution, which requires taxes to be
uniform throughout the United States.48
The district court invalided the Act on the grounds that the statute
impermissibly drew distinctions based on geographic boundaries.49 The
Supreme Court reversed, rejecting this Equal Sovereignty-type argument.50
In doing so, the Court noted that Alaska's exemption from the tax "reflects
Congress' considered judgment that unique climatic and geographic
conditions require that oil produced from this exempt area be treated as a
separate class of oil."'51 The Court also pointed out that drilling wells in
Alaska costs more than in other parts of the United States, thus, justifying
the exemption.52 The Court concluded that Alaskan oil "merited favorable
treatment., 53 This case may also illustrate that private parties, not just
states, have the ability to raise Equal Sovereignty-type arguments. Thus,
43. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013).
44. NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 224 (3d Cir. N.J. 2013).
45. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1983).
46. Id. at 77-78.
47. Id.
48. Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549, 550 (D. Wyo. 1982).
49. Id. at 553.
50. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 80.
51. Id. at 79.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 86.
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this case can serve as a guide in instances where private parties are harmed
by the inapplicability of a law or policy in a particular state.
B. Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency
("NE')
In NEI, the plaintiffs challenged the federal government's decision to
designate Yucca Mountain in Nevada as a national nuclear waste repository
site.54 Congress decided to locate the waste at Yucca Mountain after it
abandoned the lengthy and time-consuming process detailed in the National
Waste Policy Act for selecting sites to store nuclear waste.55  Congress
amended the original law by requiring the government to focus exclusively
on Yucca Mountain.56  Because the law was not facially neutral, the
petitioners contended, it violated the Tenth Amendment and "principles of
federalism ostensibly inherent in the Constitution as a whole., 57  The
plaintiffs contended that the law violated the Constitution's "equal
treatment" requirement because it imposed unique burdens on the state of
Nevada. 58 The plaintiffs argued that while there is no direct textual basis
supporting the concept of equal treatment of the states, the concept is
implied from the existence of the Guarantee Clause, the Port Preference
Clause, the Uniformity Clause, the Bill of Attainder Clause, and the Equal
Footing doctrine.59
The NEI court rejected the petitioner's Tenth Amendment and equal
treatment arguments on several grounds. In rejecting the Tenth
Amendment claim, the court heavily factored in the fact that Yucca
Mountain was federal property, and that under the Property Clause,
Congress has plenary power over federal lands. 60 Additionally, the law did
not regulate the state's activities, but only circumscribed the state's ability
to use Yucca Mountain for another purpose. The court also held that
because the national political process did not operate in a defective manner
when Congress chose to designate Yucca Mountain as the national waste
54. Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
55. Id. at 1260.
56. Id at 1260-61.
57. Id. at 1305.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1308 ("We fail to see, moreover, how the constraints demanded by Nevada's
claim would be consistent with the plenary nature of Congress's Property Clause authority.").
61. Id. at 1305.
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repository, the Tenth Amendment was not implicated. 62 In rejecting the
petitioner's equal treatment argument, the court simply stated that the
"novel" concept "has no textual basis in the Constitution." 63
C. Shelby County v. Holder
At issue in Shelby County was the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act. 64 The Act requires that certain states and counties, determined
by a coverage formula, would have to seek prior approval from the
Department of Justice before making changes to local election laws. 65 Nine
southern states were largely singled out by the preclearance formula, which
applied to jurisdictions that historically employed a voter suppression
device such as a literacy test or poll tax.66 Shelby County, Alabama, a
covered jurisdiction under the Act, sought an injunction against the
enforcement of the law and a declaratory judgment that the coverage
formula was facially unconstitutional.67
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in Shelby County asserted that there is
a "fundamental principle of equal sovereignty among the states," and that
the principle is relevant to assessing federal government action that treats
states differently. 68 Accordingly, the opinion articulated the standard that
should apply to laws in this context. "A departure from the fundamental
principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute's disparate
geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets." 69
Thus, the federal government must have a sufficient justification for
treating states differently.
The opinion alludes to the idea that the Act's departure from the Equal
Sovereignty Principle may have been necessary at the time it was enacted
in order to address pervasive racial discrimination that Black communities
faced in attempting to exercise the franchise. 70 However, given the recent
trends suggesting that Blacks and Whites in covered jurisdictions were
approaching parity, and even exceeding the rates of participation and
registration in noncovered jurisdictions, the majority in Shelby County
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1306.
64. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621 (2013).
65. Id. at 2623.
66. South Carolina v. Katzenbaeh, 383 U.S. 301, 329 (1966).
67. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622.
68. Id. at 2624.
69. Id. at 2627.
70. Id. at 2618.
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contended that the conditions giving rise to the extraordinary expansion of
71federal power were no longer present. The opinion, however,
acknowledged that discrimination in voting still takes place. Thus, in spite
of the continued existence of the problems that the statute attempts to
address, the Court held that there was not a sufficient justification for the
disparate treatment of the states based on the original coverage formula.
7 2
This suggests that federal government must clear a significantly high bar
when treating states differently, rather than simply requiring a rational
relationship between the problems and the statute's means to address them.
The opinion further describes the mechanics of the Act, and how they
serve to create disparities amongst the states.73 For example, the Act
requires covered jurisdictions to go through the lengthy and time-
consuming preclearance process, whereas uncovered jurisdictions that may
have worse voting outcomes, are not subject to the onerous requirements
outlined by the Act.74 Accordingly, it may be surmised that the Court was
troubled that the problems sought to be addressed in the Act were present
in uncovered jurisdictions, yet went unregulated under the statute because
the preclearance formula did not adapt to changing conditions.
Therefore, under the Equal Sovereignty Principle as articulated in
Shelby County, the Court is suspicious of federal action that treats states
differently without having a sufficient justification because it upsets the
relationship between the federal government and the states. Thus, statutes
that allow states to slip by unregulated under a scheme where the problems
addressed in the regulation are occurring may be constitutionally
problematic.
D. NCAA v. New Jersey
The Third Circuit considered Equal Sovereignty arguments post
Shelby County in NCAA v. New Jersey.75  The State of New Jersey
attempted to license gambling on professional and amateur sports. 76 The
plaintiffs argued that New Jersey's decision violated the Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Act ("PASPA"), which made the licensing of
sports betting illegal in most states.77 New Jersey argued that PASPA was
71. Id at 2625.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2624.
74. Id.
75. NCAA v. N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
76. Id. at214.
77. Id.
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unconstitutional on Equal Sovereignty grounds because it permits Nevada
to license widespread sports gambling while banning other states from the
activity.
78
The Third Circuit's analysis of the Equal Sovereignty Principle first
required it to ascertain whether the law was permissible under the
Commerce Clause. 79 After concluding that PASPA regulates an activity
that has substantial effects on interstate commerce, and is therefore valid,
the court rejected New Jersey's Equal Sovereignty argument. 80 The court
rested its decision on the fact that in Shelby County, the Voting Rights Act
was enacted pursuant to Congress's power under the post-Civil War
Amendments, rather than the Commerce Clause:
Indeed, while the guarantee of uniformity in treatment
amongst the states cabins some of Congress' powers, see,
e.g., U.S. Const., art. I., § 8, cl. 1 (requiring uniformity in
duties and imposts); id. § 9, cl. 6 (requiring uniformity in
regulation of state ports), no such guarantee limits the
Commerce Clause.
8
'
The court expressed concern that a one-size-fits-all approach for laws
enacted under the Commerce Clause would severely circumscribe
Congress's power.82  The court also noted that even if the Equal
Sovereignty Principle applied to legislation enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, PASPA would still pass muster because the law served
to single out a Nevada for favorable treatment, which was unlike the case
in Shelby County, where the Voting Rights Act singled out states for
disfavored treatment. 83 Furthermore, the court noted that New Jersey's
invocation of the Equal Sovereignty Principle to invalidate PASPA
altogether was inappropriate: "[I]f PASPA's preferential treatment of
Nevada violates the equal-sovereignty doctrine, the solution is not to strike
down only that exemption. The remedy New Jersey seeks-a complete
invalidation of PASPA-does far more violence to the statute, and would
be a particularly odd result.,
84
78. Id.
79. Id. at 224.
80. Id. at 225-26.
81. Id at 238.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 239.
84. Id.
[Vol. 43:4
III. The Equal Sovereignty Framework
Given the infrequent invocation of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, it
is unclear what, exactly, an Equal Sovereignty analysis entails. The
seminal Equal Sovereignty case, Shelby County, provides little guidance on
how the doctrine could be applied in future instances. Thomas Colby
argues that in NCAA v. New Jersey, the Third Circuit's treatment of the
Equal Sovereignty claim post-Shelby County was akin to the court
throwing its hands up in the air.85  However, looking closely at the
aforementioned cases, the outcomes are reconcilable. The cases reveal that
the essential aspects of the doctrine include: 1) whether the law calls for
disparate treatment of the states; 2) whether the issue at hand raises
concerns regarding the vertical balance of power by regulating in an area
traditionally performed by states; and 3) whether there is sufficient
justification for the disparate treatment.
The first step in the Equal Sovereignty analysis is whether the law at
issue treats states differently. The Shelby County Court specified that the
principle is operative any time there is disparate treatment of the states,
while the Third Circuit suggested that an Equal Sovereignty analysis is
limited to instances where the disparate treatment resulted in unfavorable
treatment for one or more states, as was the case in Shelby County. The
totality of the aforementioned Equal Sovereignty cases suggest that Equal
Sovereignty issues arise when one or more states are specifically benefited
or burdened in a regime, rather than when the impact of a facially neutral
regime happens to disproportionately fall on one or more states.
Disparate treatment was present in every equal sovereignty case. For
example, in Ptasynski, the statute named Alaska as a recipient of the oil tax
exemption, rather than basing the exemption on a set of neutral criteria,
such as the cost of drilling exceeding the national average by some
amount. 86 In NEI, Yucca Mountain in Nevada was the site statutorily
designated for nuclear waste without any consideration of other sites. 87 In
Shelby County, however, the use of the preclearance formula may indicate
disparate impact rather than disparate treatment because of a formula's
perceived neutrality, but it was clear that the Shelby County Court viewed
the formula's unchanging nature as de facto disparate treatment: the
formula would always result in the application of the preclearance
85. Colby, supra note 35, at 4.
86. Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549, 551 (D. Wyo. 1982).
87. Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1260-61 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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requirement to the same states without Congress amending the formula.
88
Hence, if there is only a disparate impact on the states rather than the
presence of treatment, there are likely no Equal Sovereignty concerns.
However, if disparate treatment is present, the next step in the analysis
is to determine whether the disparate treatment raises concerns regarding
the vertical separation of powers. In NEI, Congress's regulation of nuclear
waste likely did not raise a federalism problem because it was an issue of
national concern, thus making it an appropriate subject for congressional
action. Similarly, in Ptasynski and NCAA, the taxing of domestic oil
producers in response to international oil markets and the regulation of
gambling did not arouse suspicion of federal aggrandizement. In contrast,
in Shelby County, the Court noted that decisions regarding voting were
traditionally a province of state governments, thus federal regulation in this
area raised concerns regarding the balance of power between federal and
state government.
The cases also illustrate that an integral part of the balance of power
analysis takes into consideration whether the law or regulation represents a
valid exercise of power.89 For example, in NEI, Congress was properly
acting pursuant to its broad powers under the Property Clause by choosing
to designate Yucca Mountain as the nuclear waste repository site: Yucca
Mountain is federal property.90 In NCAA, Congress was exercising its
power to regulate interstate commerce, and in Ptasynski, Congress was
acting under its taxing power. 91 Thus, when the Constitution allots broad
powers to a branch of government and it is acting in furtherance of that
broad grant of power, the balance of power problem is not implicated.
The last step of the analysis, as articulated in Shelby County, is
whether the federal government has sufficient justification for the disparate
treatment and also that it is sufficiently related to the problem that it
targets. In Shelby County, the Court struck down the preclearance formula
because there was an insufficient basis to continue using it to impose
onerous requirements on covered jurisdictions. 92 It was important that the
condition sought to be regulated by the Voting Rights Act-
disenfranchisement of Black communities-was present (or may have been
88. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2615 (2013) ("Coverage still turned on whether
a jurisdiction had a voting test in the 1960s or 1970s, and had low voter registration or turnout at
that time.").
89. NCAA v. N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 224 (3d Cir. 2013) (analyzing the Commerce Clause
claim before addressing the Equal Sovereignty issue).
90. NEI, 373 F.3d at 1308.
91. NCAA, 730 F.3d at 225-26; Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 80.
92. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
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worse) in uncovered jurisdictions.93  In contrast, in Ptasynski, the Court
cited the costs of drilling oil in Alaska, as compared to other domestic
sources of oil, as a sufficient justification for exempting oil producers in
that state from the windfall profits tax since the high price of oil would risk
oil production there and therefore would result in a loss of tax revenues.
94
Thus, the exemption, which served as the basis for disparate treatment, was
found to be justified by the local conditions. In Shelby County, there were
insufficient differences between covered and uncovered jurisdictions to
justify the difference in treatment.
IV. Applying the Equal Sovereignty Doctrine to the Clean Power
Rule
Using the framework discussed above, in order to evaluate whether
the Clean Power Rule violates the Equal Sovereignty Principle, we must
first ascertain whether the principle applies. If the regulation treats states
differently in some respect, the doctrine is applicable. If, on the other hand,
there is only the presence of disparate impact rather than disparate
treatment, the Equal Sovereignty Principle does not apply. Next, if
disparate treatment is present, the question is whether there are balance of
power concerns with the federal regulation of the subject at hand. If the
subject of regulation does not concern the vertical balance of power, the
regulation would pass muster under the Equal Sovereignty Principle.
However, if the regulation concerns an area that has traditionally been
under the purview of states, we must next examine whether there is a
sufficient justification for the disparate treatment. If there are insufficient
differences between the regulated and unregulated jurisdictions with
respect to the target problem at hand, the justification is insufficient, and
the Clean Power Rule would violate the Equal Sovereignty Principle.
A. Whether the Equal Sovereignty Principle Applies
The threshold question is whether the Equal Sovereignty Principle
applies. As the Third Circuit indicated, there may be certain limitations on
when the doctrine applies in a given context.95 As discussed previously,
the Equal Sovereignty Principle may not apply to circumstances where
there is a disparate impact of a facially neutral law or policy; doing so
would severely circumscribe congressional power, which the Third Circuit
93. Id. at 2622.
94. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 79.
95. NCAA, 730 F.3d at 239.
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noted was a concern in a broader application of the Equal Sovereignty
Principle.
96
Here, in challenging the Clean Power Rule, opponents could argue
that the rule results in disparate treatment for two reasons. First, the Clean
Power Rule specifically exempts Alaska and Hawaii even though the states
have qualifying EGUs under the rule. Alaska and Hawaii did not qualify
for an exemption on the basis of neutral criteria that would have been
available to other states if they simply harbored specific traits that would
serve as the grounds for an exemption. Rather, the states were specifically
named, akin to the circumstances in NEI and Ptasynski. Therefore, the
exemption constitutes disparate treatment, and the Equal Sovereignty
Principle applies to this claim.
Second, opponents to the rule may also use the burden borne by the
coal states as evidence of disparate treatment. The rule itself acknowledges
that it is likely to result in more onerous burdens for states that depend on
coal as compared to other states.97 Thus, they may contend that it is
analogous to the scheme in Shelby County where the majority opinion
characterized the coverage formula as disparate treatment, even though the
formula did not specifically name the states the formula applied to. This
argument, however, is unpersuasive. In Shelby County, the coverage
formula was based on conditions that were operative on or before a
specified year, so a state could never escape the preclearance requirement,
regardless of what steps or measures were taken subsequently to address
the problem of disenfranchisement. In contrast, in the Clean Power Plan, a
state's status is dependent on the number of fossil fuel burning power
plants within the state, so a state could theoretically escape the regulatory
burden by taking remedial action. The rule calls for determining a state's
GHG emissions target based on the number and type of energy plants
located within the state; states with more EGUs may face more regulatory
burdens than states with fewer EGUs. Consequently, the Equal
Sovereignty Principle likely does not apply to this argument.
Under the Third Circuit's jurisprudence, the Equal Sovereignty
Principle seemingly only applies when one or more states have been
singled out for unfavorable treatment. This limiting principle may make
the doctrine easier to apply and may be useful for courts in considering
Equal Sovereignty claims. Here, if only unfavorable treatment is sufficient
to invoke the application of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, proponents of
96. Id. at 238.
97. Clean Power Rule, supra note 1, at 64670 (discussing the POWER+ plan to help coal
states grapple with changes to their economy as a result of the rule).
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the exemption would argue that it constitutes favorable treatment for
Alaska and Hawaii, and thus, the Equal Sovereignty Principle does not
apply here as well.
From a traditional federalism analysis, it may be the case that
regulation, generally, constitutes disfavored treatment, and a lack of
regulation constitutes favorable treatment. However, the
favorable/unfavorable analysis could be construed more broadly: If we
consider the benefits a state receives from a particular regulatory scheme,
the deprivation of these benefits could, actually, constitute disfavored
treatment. This conception is warranted under the Equal Sovereignty
Principle because it seemingly arises from a distinct legal premise, rather
than from the Commerce Clause or the Tenth Amendment, where the
favorable/unfavorable analysis takes for granted that the presence of
regulation is a per se burden on the state.
With regards to the Clean Power Rule, research suggests that there are
significant benefits associated with its implementation. 98  David E.
Adelman and David B. Spence contend that the benefits of the Clean Power
Plan would exceed the costs of the regulation, and that the benefits of
reducing emissions under the rule would be predominantly felt locally.
99
Several studies support the conclusion that coal plants are responsible for
more damage to public health and the environment than any other industrial
source.1°° Opponents of the exemption could argue that, because the
exemption would result in preventing the people of Alaska and Hawaii
from experiencing the benefits of the Clean Power Plan, the lack of
regulation constitutes unfavorable treatment.1l 1 Therefore, even under a
requirement that the Equal Sovereignty Principle only applies to disfavored
treatment, the Equal Sovereignty Principle should apply in this context.
B. Whether There Are Federalism Concerns
Because the state exemptions likely constitute disparate treatment, and
the treatment can be characterized as unfavorable, the next question is
whether the subject of the regulation indicates that there may be balance of
power issues. If the subject of the federal regulation has traditionally been
98. David E. Adelman & David B. Spence, Cost-Benefit Politics in U.S. Energy (Aug. 11,
2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract=2642459.
99. Id. at 23.
100. Id.
101. Suzanna Caldwell, Fairbanks Air Quality a Dirty Shame Locals Call a Community
Health Crisis, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.adn.com/article/fairbanks-
air-quality-dirty-shame-locals-call-community-health-crisis.
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under the purview of state governments, this is more likely to raise
federalism concerns, as was the case in Shelby County and voting
decisions.
Here, there are plausible arguments on both sides concerning the
Clean Power Plan. Proponents of the existing rule can argue that, because
the regulation is modeled after the Clean Air Act which has been found to
pass constitutional muster, the Clean Power Rule's cooperative federalism
approach also does not raise constitutional concerns. Additionally,
proponents of the existing rule may argue that carbon pollution raises an
issue of international significance, which makes the issue appropriate for
the federal government to address. The recent Conference of the Parties
meeting in Paris illustrates the global consequences of domestic efforts to
reduce emissions: each country's commitment to curtail its emissions has
been meticulously documented, and the international community has
reached an agreement on a framework for addressing climate change.,
°2
Proponents could argue the Clean Power Plan does not upset the balance of
state and federal power because the issue of climate change is inherently an
international one where the U.S. must speak with one voice on the world
stage. Therefore, they could argue that executive action on this subject is
in accords with the international dimension of the issue of climate change.
However, opponents of the rule have a compelling argument that the
subject of regulation does, indeed, touch an area that is traditionally under
state purview. Professor Laurence Tribe argues that the rule
"impermissibly trenches on State authority over intrastate energy
regulation." 10 3 This argument rests on significant legal precedent. The
Supreme Court has recognized that energy production and energy choices
are decisions for state governments to make.' °4 Even federal statutes
recognize the states' authority in this arena: under the Federal Power Act,
the regulation of intrastate electricity is the exclusive province of the
states. 105
Here, opponents of the rule may argue that the Clean Power Plan is
designed to compel the states to make cleaner energy choices, and serves as
an end run around established precedent developed under the Commerce
Clause in the field of energy law. This is because the rule arguably limits
102. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N.
Doc. FCC/CP/2015/L.9 (Dec. 12, 2015).
103. Tribe, supra note 23, at 19.
104. PG & E v. State Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 224 (1983) ("States traditionally have
possessed the authority to choose which technologies to rely on in meeting their energy needs.").
105. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a).
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states' authority to regulate its energy sector or make decisions about its
energy choices, an area that has been recognized as a subject of state
regulation. Therefore, the Clean Power Rule likely raises federalism
concerns akin to the voting regulations in Shelby County.
C. Whether There Is Sufficient Justification for the Disparate Treatment
Because the Clean Power Rule results in disparate treatment, and
likely raises federalism concerns by regulating in an area traditionally left
to the states, the next inquiry is whether there is sufficient justification for
exempting Alaska and Hawaii from the Clean Power Rule. Shelby County
suggested that this inquiry is demanding, requiring more than just a rational
basis for the disparate treatment. 0 6 The final rule states: "Because the EPA
does not possess all of the information or analytical tools needed to
quantify the BSER for the two non-contiguous states with otherwise
affected EGUs (Alaska and Hawaii) . .. [the] emission guidelines do not
apply to those areas." 107 The rule further explains that setting targets for
noncontiguous states would not be appropriate because they are
geographically isolated. 0 8 Thus, the two justifications for the disparate
treatment is the EPA's lack of information to set emissions targets and the
states' geographic isolation. The question therefore becomes whether these
two justifications are sufficiently related to the problem that the regulation
targets: climate change.
109
With regard to the first justification given by the EPA, it must be
noted that the EPA did, in fact, initially issue emissions target for the State
of Alaska."l0 An Alaska air quality official expressed that the exemption
came as a surprise."' The decision to exempt the State of Alaska was
lauded by the utilities industry in the state, and some have suggested that
the EPA was influenced by the potential costs facing the state as a result of
the plan, even though other states that are covered under the rule expressed
106. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622 (2013) ("a departure from the fundamental
principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute's disparate geographic coverage is
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.").
107. Clean Power Rule, supra note 1, at 64664.
108. Id. at 64826.
109. Id. at 64664 ("This rule establishes, at the same time, the foundation for longer term
GHG emission reduction strategies necessary to address climate change and, in so doing,
confirms the international leadership of the U.S. in the global effort to address climate change.").
110. Memorandum from Norman Rokeburg, Regulatory Comm. of Alaska, to Senator Cathy
Geiscl (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.legis.statc.ak.us/basis/get documents.asp?docid=3479.
11l. Elwood Brehmer, Utilities, Leaders Welcome Exemption From Emissions Rule,
ALASKA JOURNAL OF COMMERCE (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.alaskajournal.com/business-and-
finance/2015-08-06/utilities-leaders-wclcomc-exemption-emissions-rule#.VnwO7d-rRE4.
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similar concerns." 2 Indeed, Alaska's political leadership lobbied for an
exemption from the rule,1 3 and was reportedly given assurances from EPA
Administrator Gina McCarthy emission standards are unlikely to be
imposed on Alaska.1 4 Hence, the fact that the EPA set targets for the state
but later withdrew it as a result of intense lobbying indicates that the
justification of a lack of information is unlikely to withstand intense
review. " 
5
The second justification for the exemption is that Alaska and Hawaii
are geographically isolated." 6  In justifying the decision to not set
emissions targets for these states, the EPA cited Massachusetts v. EPA for
the proposition that "the Courts have recognized the authority of agencies
to develop regulatory programs in step-by-step fashion."" 7 However, this
argument is also unpersuasive, and likely would not clear the test
articulated in Shelby County, which requires a showing that the difference
in treatment of the states is related to the problem the regulation is
targeting. 118
Because the goal of the regulation is to address climate change, the
only valid reason for exempting states from the Clean Power Plan would be
on the basis of those states not contributing to the problem of emissions
from qualifying EGUs. Here, Alaska and Hawaii do have qualifying EGUs
but were exempt from the regulation nonetheless. While the States of
Alaska and Hawaii are isolated from the continental United States, climate
change, however, is not a geographically isolated phenomenon: the
greenhouse gas emissions contributing to the problem of climate change
are present in Alaska and Hawaii, but the regulation still leaves them out.
The effect of the exemption here is analogous to the circumstance in Shelby
County that was found to raise an Equal Sovereignty problem: the problem
exists in the unregulated jurisdictions as well, but only the regulated
jurisdictions bear the burden of the Clean Power Plan. Interestingly, the
rule repeatedly acknowledges how Alaska in particular is facing challenges
112. Id.
113. Erica Martinson, Murkowski Urges EPA To Drop Alaska From Climate Change Rule,
ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.adn.com/article/20150429/murkowski-
urges-cpa-drop-alaska-climate-change-rule.
114. Power Plan Hub, E&E NEWS, http://www.eenews.net/interactive/cleanpowerplan
/states/alaska (last visited Dec. 22, 2015).
115. Clean Power Rule, supra note 1, at 64671.
116. Id.at64825.
117. Id.at64826.
118. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2627 (2013).
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attributed to climate change.' 19 It is particularly problematic to exclude the
state from the Clean Power Plan, effectively depriving the residents of the
state from experiencing the localized benefits associated with the rule's
implementation where the need is clearly acute.
The EPA's citation of Massachusetts v. EPA to justify not extending
emissions targets to these states is also problematic. The Court explained
there that a step-by-step approach justifies incremental actions to alleviate
climate change. However, this statement does not justify a violation of the
Equal Sovereignty Principle. Every step that the federal government takes
to alleviate climate change can be taken in a manner that maintains the
integrity of the Equal Sovereignty Principle. The incremental step
approach endorsed in Massachusetts v. EPA was meant to address the
challenge of solving climate change across all states over time, rather than
trying to solve the problem on a state-by-state basis.120 Thus, the EPA's
citation to the case to justify the exemption was erroneous. The disparate
treatment, therefore, is not sufficiently justified.
To remedy this Equal Sovereignty problem, the EPA need only
include Alaska and Hawaii in the rule. This approach is consistent with the
idea raised in the NCAA case, which mentioned that the best way to remedy
an Equal Sovereignty problem may be to nullify the exemption, rather than
striking the rule down altogether.
Conclusion
Although there are two bases to argue that the states are being treated
under the Clean Power Plan, only the argument that the exempted state is
experiencing disfavored treatment is a candidate for the application of the
Equal Sovereignty Principle. The government must have a sufficient
justification for the disparate treatment. Here, given that the government
did seek to include Alaska in rule and only exempted the state at the very
last stages of the rulemaking process, and did not articulate a compelling
reason for this policy change, the rule is likely unconstitutional under the
Equal Sovereignty Principle. The application of the Equal Sovereignty
Principle would allow Alaska and Hawaii to realize the localized benefits
119. Clean Power Rule, supra note 1, at 64683 ("Climate change may also exacerbate
ongoing environmental pressures in certain settlements, particularly in Alaskan indigenous
communities."); id. at 64685 ("Particularly in Alaska, critical infrastructure and traditional
livelihoods are threatened by climate change."); id. at 64687 (In Alaska, temperatures have
changed faster than anywhere else in the U.S.").
120. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1457 (2007) (discussing redressability
arguments).
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of the Clean Power Plan while helping to decrease the United States'
contribution to global emissions.
Unless the Supreme Court articulates a limiting principle to the
doctrine of Equal Sovereignty, environmentalists should be aware of the
significance of the doctrine due to the impacts of climate change. Climate
change will more than likely necessitate Congress to pass laws to deal with
problems that require nuance and may be state-specific. The fact that laws
or regulations in the future must have a sufficient justification for disparate
treatment may be incompatible with the practical aspects of how legislation
is passed, so it is important that laws are written in more neutral terms.
The Equal Sovereignty Principle could both be used to strike down
laws that are important to environmentalists, or it could be used to increase
the reach of environmentally protective statutes by preventing states from
receiving exemptions from obligations, which are not sufficiently justified.
This is important because every ton of C02 emissions could prove critical
in stemming the impact of climate change. Furthermore, this principle
could help ensure that all states have responsibilities to combat climate
change, instead of leaving the most vulnerable states to shoulder the
burden.
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